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DAVIS V. WASHINGTON AND HAMMON V. 
INDIANA: BEATING EXPECTATIONS 
Robert P. Mosteller*†
I begin with a question of effectiveness: does the new Confrontation 
Clause doctrine effectively protect defendants with respect to the most im-
portant types of problematic out-of-court statements? Although they leave 
much room for the introduction of hearsay in the immediate aftermath of 
crime generally, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (together 
hereinafter Davis) are better opinions from that broad perspective than I had 
feared. The new doctrine now covers and provides substantial procedural 
protection for a very important class of problematic hearsay—statements 
made to government agents investigating past crime. 
The protection of Ohio v. Roberts was figuratively a mile wide but usu-
ally not even an inch deep. Under it, firmly rooted hearsay that had 
independent evidentiary significance, such as an excited utterance, was auto-
matically admitted, and even when core concerns were present, such as with 
statements against interest by co-defendants, its amorphous trustworthiness 
test was relatively ineffectual. But it was better than nothing and occasion-
ally protected defendants from problematic hearsay—for example in Lilly v. 
Virginia (statements against interest by a codefendant) and Idaho v. Wright 
(accusatory hearsay produced by leading questions admitted under a catch-
all exception in a child sexual abuse case). It would be easy to surpass 
Roberts, but I worried after Crawford v. Washington that the new doctrine 
would be roughly the Roberts inverse—deep but only an inch wide. 
Two perspectives can be taken on the breadth of Davis. One is that cases 
exactly like Michael Crawford’s and Hershel Hammon’s establish the pe-
rimeter of the Confrontation Clause. The second is that the Clause will 
likely have a somewhat broader perimeter as the promising aspects of Davis 
are interpreted reasonably, rather than restrictively. No doubt, some of my 
current favorable reaction and occasional optimism come from having 
highly pessimistic expectations exceeded. I continue to worry that the full 
breadth of coverage is described by the facts of Crawford and Hammon, and 
in particular, I worry that the Court’s strong invitation to use forfeiture to 
avoid exclusion of testimonial statements of unavailable declarants will be 
expansively developed. The Court in Crawford argued that the Framers 
would not have trusted judges to dispense with confrontation through a de-
termination of reliability, which it likened to eliminating the right to a trial 
because of a defendant’s obvious guilt. The law allows it and the doctrine is 
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different, but under forfeiture the Court approves much the same result. For-
feiture permits judges, whom the Framers distrusted, to use the unconfronted 
hearsay to determine the defendant guilty of securing unavailability and 
thereby dispense with confrontation. My concerns are far more than quib-
bles, but by covering statements made to investigative officers inquiring 
about past crime, the Clause now demands real confrontation for a major 
problematic area where Roberts often failed. After Davis, the doctrine un-
equivocally applies to most statements by criminal co-participants when 
questioned by the police. Whether it will extend to problematic hearsay in, 
for example, child sexual abuse cases is quite possible, but undetermined. 
Much uncertainty remains. The Crawford decision left a remarkably 
large number of issues unresolved. Davis answered a few of those questions 
definitively and continued hints at the answers to several other questions 
(for example, there may be no protection when statements are made to indi-
viduals not known to be government officers), but it left most issues as it 
found them—unresolved. 
Backtracking from an attempt at a comprehensive definition. Not only 
did Davis not attempt a comprehensive definition of what is meant by “tes-
timonial,” but even more remarkably, it did not work within the three 
possible definitions set out in Crawford. Its positive holding was not in lan-
guage directly relating to any one of those three definitions. 
Rejecting Justice Thomas’s definition. While not building positively on 
any of Crawford’s definitions, Davis’s most important clarification of a pos-
sible interpretation of Crawford was its rejection of some of the more 
extreme readings of the formality and formalism of Thomas’s definition taken 
from his concurring opinion in White v. Illinois (with Scalia concurring). 
Thomas would have defined testimonial statements as “formalized testimonial 
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”  
Rejecting formality of statement form. As I have stated elsewhere, Craw-
ford had left open the possibility that the formality of the statement might be 
given dispositive weight, which could have led to manipulation by investiga-
tive officers in their decision to record a statement or to rely on memory or 
informal notes, an approach some lower courts had effectively embraced. In 
Davis, the Supreme Court largely eliminated that concern: 
[W]e do not think it conceivable that the protections of the Confrontation 
Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking policeman recite the 
unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant instead of having the declarant 
sign a deposition. . . . The product of [police interrogation to prove or es-
tablish past crime], whether reduced to a writing signed by the declarant or 
embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of the interrogating officer, 
is testimonial. 
Rejecting formality of proceedings and limitation of procedural situa-
tions resembling historical inquisitorial practices. In his dissenting opinion 
in Davis, Thomas adhered to his earlier position and even embellished it 
along the lines that a number of lower courts had followed in limiting the 
testimonial concept to statements produced in proceedings that resembled 
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What is left of these various elements of formality, formalism, and inter-
rogation? Scalia’s opinion certainly did not remove all limitations, and it 
articulated one new potentially significant limitation. He stated, “It imports 
sufficient formality . . . that lies to [police] officers are criminal offenses.” 
The possibility of prosecution for false statements in combination with the 
fact that the opinion continued to speak of interrogation, even when that 
term no longer appeared accurate, certainly allows future opinions to limit 
testimonial statements to those given to persons known to be government 
investigative agents, where false statements may be prosecuted as criminal 
offenses. Indeed, the Court did nothing to remove the broader possibility 
that only statements made to known government investigative agents would 
be covered. It assumed without deciding that, if 911 operators are not police 
officers, they may be agents of law enforcement when they conduct interro-
gations of 911 callers. The degree to which responses developed by non-law 
enforcement personnel are covered and when private individuals and organi-
zations become “agents” are unanswered questions that are important in 
many cases, particularly those involving child sexual abuse. 
the historical practices believed to have animated the Framers’ decision to 
include the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment. Scalia described 
these in Crawford—the Privy Council of Raleigh’s case and the examining 
magistrates of the Marian Statutes. A number of lower courts excluded most 
statements received by officers in the field because they did not resemble the 
procedures employed by the examining magistrates under the Marian Stat-
utes. Together, the formality of the form of the statement (written or 
recorded) and the formality of proceedings would have frequently permitted 
investigators to obtain accusatory hearsay statements and still avoid Con-
frontation Clause protection. 
Davis rejected the effort to limit testimonial statements to those pro-
duced in procedures resembling the historical situations of concern to the 
Framers. In doing so, Scalia made a statement that rung remarkably like a 
justice who believes in an evolving Constitution: “Restricting the Confronta-
tion Clause to the precise forms against which it was originally directed is a 
recipe for its extinction.”  
Rejecting a rigorous interrogation requirement. Crawford had presented 
the possibility that formality almost equivalent to Marian procedures would 
be achieved by a requirement of the rigorous stationhouse interrogation that 
occurred there. It spoke both of police interrogation and structured question. 
In Hammon, the questioning was in the field rather than in the police station 
and the person questioned was an apparent victim, so as one would imagine 
the questioning was not nearly as forceful and rigorous as that involved in 
Crawford, where Sylvia Crawford was a suspected co-participant in the ag-
gravated assault. Hammon did involve questions—what the Court continued 
to term “interrogation.” But the Court made explicit that neither pointed 
questioning nor even questioning itself was required: “The Framers were no 
more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or 
answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to de-
tailed interrogation.” 
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Webster’s Dictionary as Constitutional Text. If one were looking for a 
text for Davis, one would assume that text was the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Indeed, that is where Scalia begins with “wit-
nesses against [the accused].” However, the true text he is interpreting is 
Noah Webster’s 1828 edition of An American Dictionary of the English 
Language. Testimony is defined there as “[a] solemn declaration or affirma-
tion made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” As 
described above, Scalia did not emphasize the “solemn declaration or affir-
mation” aspect of the definition. Instead, he focused on “made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” That is the core of the defini-
tion of testimonial statements in Davis. If made under police questioning, a 
statement is testimonial when “the circumstances objectively indicate that 
. . . the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” 
However, Scalia’s test makes a somewhat subtle shift from the “text.” In 
the text from Webster’s dictionary, the issue is the purpose of the declaration 
or affirmation. In Scalia’s test, it is the purpose of police questioning. Thus, 
he shifts the critical intent focus from speaker to questioner. But that per-
spective does not appear to be consistently followed. In a footnote on the 
same page, he states, “And of course even when interrogation exists, it is in 
the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, 
that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.” While this statement 
may not be speaking to precisely the same issue, it seems to say that the 
Constitution’s concern is the product of the interrogation and presumably 
the intent behind that product, rather than the questioning. 
Crawford gave us a reason why focusing on the questioners, when they 
are government agents, would be appropriate. There the Court stated that 
“[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production of testimony with 
an eye toward trial present[s] unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a 
fact borne out time and again throughout a history with which the Framers 
were keenly familiar.” That might warrant particular scrutiny toward the 
intent of government interrogators. As I have discussed elsewhere, however, 
defendants are harmed just as much by malicious accusers acting on their 
own as they are by government manipulation of those witnesses, and there is 
reason to assume the Framers considered the malicious or mistaken witness 
perspective. The Confrontation Clause was responsive to the Marian Stat-
utes, which applied to ordinary crime where government interest in 
manipulation would not have been clear, in addition to crime against the 
state, which was the subject of the Raleigh case and the Privy Council’s in-
terrogation. Webster’s focus on the intent of the testifier as opposed to the 
questioner adds “textual” support to this historical argument. 
If a single perspective must be chosen, it might well be that of the inves-
tigative questioner. Moreover, which party’s intent counts is not usually 
decisive. When the objectively discernable purpose of the police is to estab-
lish or prove a past fact potentially relevant to criminal prosecution, that 
should be readily observable to the speaker as well as the police. 
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Davis, however, did not resolve the issue of whose intent counts, and at 
some point, it must be addressed. I suggest that counting the declarant’s per-
spective is most critical in situations where police interrogation is not 
involved. In that situation, if the witness intends to establish or prove a fact 
about a past crime, the statement should be considered testimonial. Such an 
analysis is needed, at least to avoid purposeful avoidance of the Confronta-
tion Clause by a knowledgeable witness, and counting the declarant’s 
perspective is certainly consistent with Webster’s “text.” 
Although being interested in both the intent of the questioner and the 
speaker is unusual, it is quite appropriate for the Confrontation Clause. In 
the case of the Confrontation Clause, as opposed to the situation in Miranda 
v. Arizona, for example, the person being protected is not the witness who is 
being questioned. It is instead the defendant against whom the statement is 
being introduced. As Scalia notes, “it is the trial use of, not the investigatory 
collection of, ex parte testimonial statements which offends [the Confronta-
tion Clause].” The harm in not being able to cross-examine the witness is the 
same whether the police intended to manipulate the witness, the witness 
intended to manipulate the police, or the witness was simply mistaken. 
I end this Essay with a question about the future of the new Confronta-
tion Clause doctrine as it applies to an area of problematic hearsay of 
special interest to me—statements by children in child sexual abuse. Here, I 
principally rely on omissions from the Supreme Court’s two most recent 
Confrontation Clause opinions. Although in Crawford Scalia spent consid-
erable time reconciling the new approach with the result in many of the 
Court’s recent Confrontation Clause cases, he did not mention Idaho v. 
Wright, and his silence, while less remarkable, continued in Davis. Thus, we 
do not know whether the result in Wright is consistent with the new ap-
proach. The other case involving child sexual abuse is White v. Illinois, 
which was mentioned in both recent opinions as perhaps wrongly decided. 
However, that error in White is suggested only with respect to the statements 
to an investigating officer admitted as an excited utterance. The result is ap-
parently not questioned as to other statements admitted under the "medical 
treatment" hearsay exception to a nurse and doctor, which were secured hours 
after the investigative questioning by the police officer with no indication that 
interest had subsided in establishing or proving what White had done. 
One can imagine that the statement in Wright, which had strong investi-
gative features, might fit within the testimonial definition of Davis, but it 
might be excluded because it was not a statement to a government officer 
and certainly not to a police officer where falsehoods are criminal. Resolv-
ing under what circumstances a person becomes an agent of the police 
would be important. Whether statements to doctors who have some treat-
ment function will be virtually automatically excluded when they clearly 
also have a prosecution function must be answered. Will it be that first ex-
aminations are virtually always excluded? What if the conversations are 
recorded for potential other users as part of a team approach? Much is left to 
be decided, and the silence to this point regarding Wright certainly leaves 
the Court’s options open. 
